We consider liquidity transfers between banks through the inter-bank borrowing and asset sale markets when banks providing liquidity may have market power and assets may be bank-speci…c. We show that when the outside options of liquidity-a¤ected banks are weak, surplus banks may strategically underprovide lending. thereby inducing excessive and ine¢ cient sales of bank-speci…c assets. A regulator such as a Central Bank can ameliorate this ine¢ ciency by standing to lend to a¤ected banks, provided it has greater information about banks (for example, through supervision) compared to the outside markets, or absent such information access, it is prepared to make some loss-making loans. The public provision of liquidity to banks, or its mere credibility, can thus improve the private allocation of liquidity among banks. This rationale for the existence of a Central Bank …nds support in historical episodes preceding the modern era of Central Banking and has implications for recent debates concerning the supervisory and lender-of-last-resort roles of Central Banks.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose that during crises episodes, e¢ cient transfers of liquidity may not take place between surplus and needy banks. We attribute the source of this ine¢ ciency to the market power of liquidity-rich banks in the market for liquidity transfers between banks and the strategic gains accruing to liquidity-rich banks upon the liquidation of assets of cash-stricken ones. We argue that a Central Bank by standing ready to lend to needy banks can ameliorate this ine¢ ciency. We present conditions under which the Central Bank can improve upon the market outcomes. We provide some anecdotal support for our rationale for Central Banking based on historical episodes and discuss implications of our results for recent debates concerning the supervisory and lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) activities.
We build a model of liquidity transfers through two markets: inter-bank lending market and asset sales. Our model has three main ingredients.
First, we assume that some assets are bank-speci…c, i.e., they are worth more under current than under alternative ownership. For instance, alternative users may lack the current user's expertise. For this reason, asset sales may be less e¢ cient than borrowing.
Second, we assume frictions in the interbank lending market, which we model as a moral hazard problem. These frictions limit banks'borrowing capacity, leading to ine¢ cient asset sales.
Third, we assume that during crises episodes, identi…ed as situations when total surplus liquidity is small relative to the liquidity demand, liquidity is concentrated with a few players who enjoy market power.
In this context, we show that the market power of surplus banks leads to more asset sales, and importantly, more ine¢ cient asset sales by needy banks. This problem is more acute the weaker is the market for assets outside of the banking sector, a scenario that would arise, for instance, in liquidation of information-sensitive and speci…c loans made to small borrowers.
Such strategic behavior by surplus banks describes well the crises episodes in the preFederal Reserve era. In direct evidence for such behavior, Donaldson (1992) , using US data for the period 1873-1993, reports the stylized fact that interest rates increase and stock prices plunge during banking panics. He shows that the interest rates during panics before the establishment of the Federal Reserve System were higher than the competitive rates, which he interprets as evidence of market power for banks with excess liquidity.
Furthermore, he shows that after the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, interest rates were not di¤erent from competitive rates.
Our analysis also provides a rationale for the existence of a Central Bank to address this market failure. A Central Bank that is credible in providing liquidity to banks in need curbs the market power of surplus banks in the inter-bank market and can potentially improve the e¢ ciency of liquidity transfers and asset sales. In particular, the Central Bank can play a "virtual and virtuous" role in our model since it never actually lends in equilibrium to the needy banks, but merely improves their outside options. We show that for such an improvement to occur, the Central Bank must either be better-informed than outside markets about banks (for example, through its supervisory role), or absent such superior information, it should be prepared to lend ex post even if it ends up making losses on some assets against which it lends (for example, by lending against some lower quality assets as collateral).
To summarize, our model illustrates that the public provision of liquidity (in fact, its mere credibility) can improve the private provision of liquidity even in times when there is no aggregate shortage of liquidity. This lender-of-last-resort rationale for the existence of a Central Bank is complementary to the traditional one which pertains to times when there is in fact an aggregate shortage of liquidity. Our model also clari…es why the supervisory and LOLR roles of a Central Bank are naturally linked to each other.
Our model is related to the literature on the failure of inter-bank markets that justi…es the lender-of-last-resort role of Central Banks in lending to individual banks. However, others have argued that interbank markets may fail to ensure e¢ cient liquidity transfers due to frictions such as asymmetric information about the quality of banks' assets (Flannery, 1996) , banks' free-riding on other banks' liquidity (Bhattacharya and 2 Indirectly, therefore, our model is also related to the literature justifying the existence of interbank markets in the …rst place, speci…cally their role in coinsuring banks against each other against uncertain liquidity shocks through borrowing and lending facilities (Rochet and Tirole, 1996, and Gale, 2000) . Gale, 1987) , or on the Central Bank's liquidity (Repullo, 2005) . Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) , for example, build a model of the interbank market where banks are subject to liquidity shocks with random sizes, and where the composition of liquid and illiquid assets in each bank's portfolio as well as the size of the liquidity shock a¤ecting each bank is private information. Since the liquid asset has a lower return and given that bank portfolios and liquidity shocks are private information, banks have an incentive to under-invest in liquid assets and free-ride on the common pool of liquidity. Hence, even in the presence of an inter-bank market, there can be liquidity shortages at the aggregate level and a Central Bank that can monitor banks'asset choices may alleviate the free-rider problem.
Our paper is in the spirit of this second set of papers, but the failure in the inter-bank market arises in our model due to the strategic bene…t accruing to potential lenders once liquidity shocks have a¤ected some banks. This failure arises even in the presence of complete information about liquidity shocks. In essence, pumping liquidity into the banking sector at large does not guarantee that liquidity will end up at needy institutions. Surplus institutions may have incentives to hoard their liquidity, acquire additional liquidity in open-market operations, and channel it to needy institutions only at exorbitant rates.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides further historical evidence supporting our thesis. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 provides the analysis. Section 5 discusses factors a¤ecting the banks'outside options. Section 6 presents the rationale for Central Banking in our setup. Section 7 discusses robustness of our results to allowing for ex-ante contracting on liquidity shocks and broader implications for failures in liquidity transfers among …nancial institutions of modern-day capital markets (other than banks). Section 8 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
Historical evidence
In this section, we …rst discuss some of the private arrangements amongst banks to manage liquidity shocks prior to the modern Central Banking era, and next discuss the role of private bene…ts and strategic behavior in the failure of such arrangements, as witnessed during some signi…cant historical episodes. Similarly, the Clearinghouse System in the United States assumed the crisis prevention 3 See Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth and Sousa (1999) for an excellent survey. and management role before the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. 4 The …rst clearinghouse, established by the New York City banks in 1853, created an organized market for exchange between banks. During normal times, clearinghouses performed their service of clearing payments, whereas during crisis periods, they evolved into an organization that managed the crisis by helping member banks sustain their solvency and liquidity positions. During such periods, clearinghouses used several methods such as suspension of payments, equalization of reserves and issuance of clearing house loan certi…cates to ease the su¤ering of the member banks in distress. The equalization of reserves, which is essentially the pooling of all legal reserves of clearing house member banks in an emergency and granting member banks equal access to the pooled resources, eased the liquidity constraint on banks that experienced runs. Also, clearing houses issued loan certi…cates which were acquired by banks by depositing qualifying assets with the Clearing House Association to be used in interbank settlements. These loan certi…cates prevented costly asset liquidations and improved a¤ected banks'liquidity position. Since they were provided only when the Clearing House Association decided that the bank had enough assets to back them up, loan certi…cates also served the purpose of providing information that the bank was healthy.
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Such private arrangements and voluntary participation into rescue e¤orts to help distressed banks worked well at times in the past. However, their e¤ectiveness was hampered by the competitive pressures in the banking industry. In particular, voluntary participation in rescue e¤orts was often di¢ cult to elicit because of the short-term competitive advantage healthy banks could experience during crises. As a result, private-sector solutions became less feasible as the degree of competition in the market increased.
The Clearinghouse System was eventually brought down at the beginning of the 20th century by the marked increase in competition in the banking industry in New York.
Similarly, these arrangements became more di¢ cult to organize in the UK during the 1980s and serious di¢ culties were encountered in the rescue of Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd. due to heightened competition in the …nancial industry. 6 Historical evidence and accounts seem to con…rm the existence of this tension between the e¤ectiveness of private arrangements and the degree of competition in the …nancial system. Kindleberger (1978) , for example, highlights the tension between voluntary rescue e¤orts and competitive behavior very nicely:
4 For a discussion of the clearing house arrangements, see Gorton (1985) , Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) , Calomiris and Kahn (1996) , and Gorton and Huang (2002a, 2002b In countries where competition in the …nancial system had until recently been somewhat limited, such as France, Italy, or Germany, the notion that liquidity support should be seen primarily as the responsibility of the institutions operating in the market had however survived. 7 In contrast, the U.S. authorities at the beginning of the 1990s were concerned that the high level of competition, a characteristic of the US …nancial markets, prevented this feature of continental European banking. As Corrigan (1990) puts it:
"Private institutions either are more willing, or feel more compelled, to participate in stabilization or rescue e¤orts in foreign countries than they are in the United States. ...
Where a handful of banks dominate national banking systems, that handful of banks feels more directly threatened by potential dangers of a systemic nature than do banks here in the United States".
Focusing on the US, where data and evidence on these private arrangements have been most widely available, Donaldson (1992) provides several important insights. Using US data for the period 1873-1933, he shows that a stylized fact, during banking panics, was increased interest rates and plunging stock prices. He shows that the interest rates during panics were larger than the competitive rates, which he interprets as evidence for the strategic behavior of banks with excess liquidity. Using the strategic pricing model of Dunn and Spatt (1984) , he shows that even if there is enough liquidity to satisfy all banks'liquidity demands, if some banks have a signi…cant proportion of the excess cash 7 In Germany, LikoBank was created in the 1970s to deal with liquidity problems at smaller banks. so that the other cash rich banks'resources are not enough to satisfy the total liquidity demand, banks can exploit this captive demand and charge higher than competitive rates.
He investigates the behavior of interest rates before and after the establishment of the Federal Reserve System and shows that the interest rates after the establishment of the Federal Reserve System were not di¤erent from the competitive rates while the rates were higher than the competitive rates during the pre-Fed period (see Table 1 ).
Donaldson also tests whether interest rates were determined by the same economic structure during panic and non-panic periods, which would support the view that cash was priced competitively even during panic periods, or whether there was a structural change between the panic and non-panic periods, which would suggest that interest rates were determined by a di¤erent mechanism during panic periods, and that cash-rich banks may have used their market power to exploit the di¢ culties of cash-stricken banks. He divides the sample into two, namely, the pre-Fed (1867 ( -1913 ( ) and post-Fed (1914 ( -1933 periods, and con…rms through this econometric test that cash was indeed priced at higher than competitive rates during panics in the pre-Fed period whereas rates were not di¤erent from the competitive rates during panics in the post-Fed period (see Table 2 for results).
This suggests that the establishment of the Federal Reserve System to act as a lenderof-last-resort during panic periods prevented cash-rich banks from exerting market power and exploiting cash-stricken banks.
Given this overall background of private arrangements and their e¤ectiveness and failures, we provide below a detailed discussion of an episode from the US, the panic of 1907, where the private rescue of distressed banks was hampered by competitive behavior among banks. The banks controlled by Morgan and his associates experienced only minor di¢ culties in 1907 because of their reputation for soundness. According to Sprague (1910, pages 262-265) , while …ve banks controlled by Heinze and Morse su¤ered severe withdrawals of deposits, the six strongest clearing house banks showed slight gains in deposits. Chernow (1990) National City Bank again emerged from the panic a larger and stronger institution.
At the start, National City had higher reserve and capital ratios than its competitors, and during the panic it gained in deposits and loans relative to its competitors. Stillman (President) had anticipated and planned for this result. In response to Vanderlip's (Vice President) complaint in early 1907 that National City's low leverage and high reserve ratio was depressing pro…tability, Stillman replied: "I have felt for sometime that the next panic and low interest rates following would straighten out good many things that have of late years crept into banking. What impresses me most important is to go into next Autumn (usually a time of …nancial stringency) ridiculously strong and liquid, and now is the time to begin and shape for it...If by able and judicious management we have money to help our dealers when trust companies have suspended, we will have all the business we want for many years."
Evidence from other countries: Similar episodes have been observed in the UK as well. Bagehot wrote his famous work Lombard Street in 1873 in the aftermath of the Overend Gurney crash in 1866 when there was some suspicion that the unwillingness of the Bank of England, which was actually a private commercial bank at the time, to support that House was due to commercial rivalry. In his discussion of this episode, Bagehot points out that while it was accepted that the Central Bank should only attempt to assist those banks which could expect to be solvent or to regain solvency under normal conditions, a Central Bank should seek to act for the public good, and not simply as a private competitor for business. (1873), mainly the …nal two pages, and Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) . banking system, which was relatively unregulated during the second half of the 19th century with no central bank and no government-provided deposit insurance, experienced a banking crisis in 1893, where eleven commercial banks had failed and the rest had experienced severe bank runs. At the time of the crisis, the Associated Banks of Victoria was a coalition of private banks, just like the Clearing House Association in New York, and was initially set up to coordinate and divide the …nances of the colonial governments.
Before the crisis, the management of Associated Banks announced that, if and when the occasion arises, they would provide …nancial assistance to each other.
11 However, during the crisis, this arrangement proved to be ine¤ective when Federal Bank, a member of the Associated Banks, was allowed to fail without receiving any assistance in January 1893. Pope (1989) suggests that competitive pressures played a major role in the failure of private arrangements since banks had huge incentives not to bail out other banks as they gain from other banks'failures by increasing their market share.
The model
The timeline for our model is illustrated in Figure 1 . Consider a model with three dates t = 0; 1; 2, two banks, Bank A and Bank B, universal risk neutrality and no discounting.
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At t = 0, Bank A owns 1 units of a risky asset, e.g., loans to the corporate sector. At t = 2, each unit of asset yields a random return e R 2 f0; Rg. For each unit, the return depends on whether the unit was monitored and on the state of nature !, where ! is uniformly distributed over [0; 1], as detailed below.
At t = 1, with probability x, the asset needs some re…nancing of units of cash per unit of asset. If a unit is not re…nanced then e R = 0. If it is re…nanced (or did not need re…nancing), e R = R if ! 2 [0; p], and e R = 0 otherwise. The bank can a¤ect the probability p by monitoring its loans at t = 1: p = p H if it monitors, and p = p L = (p H p) otherwise, with p > 0. There is a moral hazard problem because monitoring is nonveri…able and the bank enjoys a private bene…t b per unit of asset if it does not monitor, with pR > b. We assume that it is always optimal to re…nance each unit of asset, i.e.,
Bank B is assumed to have enough excess liquidity to re…nance Bank A's assets. The transfer of liquidity can occur in two ways: Bank A can borrow from Bank B or sell it some of its assets. 11 The Economist, 25 March 1893, page 364. 12 The model has some similar features to Holmström and Tirole (1998) .
Borrowing: Due to limited liability, moral hazard in monitoring limits Bank A's borrowing capacity. Indeed, a loan is a transfer L to Bank A against a repayment r if e R = R and 0 if e R = 0. If Bank A is anticipated not to monitor, the assets are worthless and borrowing capacity is zero. For Bank A to choose to monitor, the following incentive compatibility constraint must hold:
Therefore, the maximum interest satisfying the constraint is:
In other words, Bank A must retain a su¢ ciently large stake to have an incentive to monitor its loans. Therefore, its borrowing capacity, i.e., the maximum loan it can get against each unit of asset is
Asset sales: Ownership of a unit of asset is sold to Bank B at a price P . We assume Bank A to be the most e¢ cient user of its assets, i.e., they are Bank A-speci…c. This may stem from expertise or learning-by-doing e¤ect for making and administering loans or the speci…c relationship it builds with its customers. Moreover, Bank A's advantage over Bank B in managing a particular loan may depend on some characteristic of the loan. For instance, smaller loans, or loans relying more on Bank A's relationship with the borrower may be more di¢ cult for Bank B to take over. We assume that the relevant loan characteristic is represented by a variable distributed over (0; +1) according to the cumulative distribution function (cdf) F . Smaller values of correspond to loans that are more di¢ cult to redeploy to Bank B. If Bank B operates a loan of Bank A with characteristic , then
With bank-speci…c assets, asset sales are less e¢ cient than borrowing. 13 However, we assume that the moral hazard problem is severe (i.e., b large) enough so that Bank A can raise more funds by selling a unit of asset than by pledging some of the return it generates.
14 Assumption 1 For all ,
We model the interaction of the two banks in the inter-bank lending and the asset markets using a two-stage bargaining game of alternating o¤er with risk of breakdown in the interim period. The game tree for our bargaining game is illustrated in Figure 2 .
First, Bank A makes Bank B a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er with three components: A subset of measure of Bank A's assets to be acquired by Bank B, a conditional repayment r (1 ) R from Bank A to Bank B, and a transfer T from Bank B to Bank A. This transfer corresponds to an average price P per unit of asset sold and a loan L per unit of asset retained, i.e., T = P + (1 ) L. Note that for a given T , the split between P and L is indeterminate (unless 2 f0; 1g).
If Bank B accepts the o¤er, it is implemented and bargaining is over. If Bank B rejects the o¤er then, with probability (1 ), bargaining breaks down and each bank receives its outside option: X i , for i = A; B.
15 With probability , however, bargaining continues and Bank B gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to Bank A. If Bank A accepts the o¤er, it is implemented. Otherwise, bargaining breaks down and each bank receives its outside option.
We assume that X A and X B are small enough, i.e., there are gains from trade between the banks. We also assume that each unit of capital that Bank B uses at t = 1 could have been invested in a project with a return of (1 + ). Hence X B can be written as the sum of the opportunity cost of using the necessary liquidity T , and the other costs arising from keeping Bank A in business (e.g. that of not being able to steal some of Bank A's business). Hence, we can write
16;17
Analysis
We solve the bargaining game by backward induction. A formal proof is in the Appendix.
Suppose that Bank B gets the chance to make an o¤er. Bank B's o¤er maximizes its payo¤ under the constraint that Bank A's payo¤ is not less than its outside option. It is easy to see that the optimal o¤er will satisfy three further properties. First, it must 15 Section 5 discusses factors that might a¤ect these outside options. 16 We assume that Bank B cannot re-sell its claim on Bank A's assets to third parties or use them as collateral to borrow from third parties. Indeed, this would amount to Bank A being able to borrow from third parties. Similarly, Bank B cannot re-sell or borrow against the assets it buys from Bank A. What is needed is that when Bank B uses liquidity, at least part of its investment capacity is destroyed. 17 For simplicity (and for now), we assume that Bank B does not borrow against its loans to Bank A or against the assets it buys from Bank A.
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (2), i.e., r (R R b ). Indeed, otherwise Bank A has no incentive to monitor its loans and it is more e¢ cient to sell them to Bank B. Second, Bank B's transfer to Bank A must be su¢ cient to re…nance Bank A's remaining assets. Indeed, these assets would otherwise be worthless and it would again be more e¢ cient to sell them to Bank B. Last, Bank B's optimal o¤er will be for Bank A to sell its most redeployable assets, i.e., all loans with above a threshold^ B (to be determined), that is, we have = [1 F (^ B )]. This is because these are the loans whose sale is the least ine¢ cient.
Given these remarks, Bank B's problem can be written as:
Lemma 1 Suppose that Bank B gets to make an o¤er.
against the sale of all loans with
Bank B's expected payo¤ is:
The intuition for the form of the o¤er is as follows. Bank B prefers to acquire as much of Bank A's assets as possible subject to Bank A getting its reservation payo¤. This is because, under Assumption 1, a transfer of ownership is the most e¢ cient means to transfer value from Bank A to Bank B. For instance, for X A = 0, Bank B acquires all of Bank A's assets for free, i.e., sets^ B = +1 and T = 0. As X A increases, Bank B must ensure that Bank A accepts its o¤er. The most e¢ cient way of increasing Bank A's payo¤ is for Bank B to leave it with some assets and re…nance them, i.e., T = F (^ B ) .
Because Bank A is best at managing its assets, this is preferred to Bank B making a cash transfer to Bank A in excess of the funding needs. For the same reason, it is always weakly optimal to maximize r, i.e., set r = (R R b ).
The intuition for Bank B's expected payo¤ is as follows. The …rst term is the payo¤ Bank B would get if it acquired all of Bank A's assets at price T = 0, i.e., if X A = 0.
When X A > 0, Bank B must "transfer back" value X A to Bank A. This is the second term, X A . This transfer is e¢ cient since Bank A is the assets' best user. Therefore, leaving value X A to Bank A costs less than X A to Bank B. This is re ‡ected in the third term.
Now consider the previous stage, when Bank A makes the …rst o¤er. For Bank B to accept an o¤er, it must ensure that Bank B receives an expected payo¤ at least equal to
As before, the optimal o¤er will satisfy three additional properties: Bank A will sell its most redeployable assets, i.e. the loans with above some threshold , and set r (R R b ) and T F ( ) . Hence, Bank A's problem can be stated as:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, Bank A and Bank B agree on a sale of all assets with and a debt contract with r = (R R b ) against a transfer T = F ( ) , and Bank
The expression for is intuitive. In equilibrium, Bank B must contribute to re…-nance all of Bank A's loans, and enjoy an expected payo¤ E ( B ). Part of [E ( B ) + ] is funded with claims of Bank B in Bank A. Due to moral hazard, the maximum value of the claims Bank B can hold in Bank A is p H (R R b )I. Therefore the RHS is simply the shortfall that Bank A can only bridge by selling assets. Indeed owning one unit of asset is more valuable to Bank B than the maximum claim it can hold against that asset, i.e.,
We highlight some properties of the negotiation's outcome in the following corollary.
Note that in equilibrium, Bank A sells a fraction [1 F ( )] of its assets which involves a deadweight loss of
Each part of the corollary can be derived by taking the derivative of equation (8) The intuition is as follows. Let
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> 0, i.e., as increases, Bank A sells more assets.
> 0, i.e., as increases, Bank A sells more assets. Indeed, when increases, so does Banks B's reservation payo¤ E ( B ). Therefore, Bank A must transfer more value to Bank B. Once Bank A has exhausted its borrowing capacity, it must start selling assets to Bank B as, in this case, this is the most e¤ective means of transferring value to Bank B (Assumption 1).
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> 0 and @ @ @ @X B < 0, i.e., an increase in Bank B's outside option leads to more asset sales, and this e¤ect is stronger when Bank B's bargaining power is small. The intuition is as follows. An increase in X B increases E ( B ) leading to more asset sales. The e¤ect is larger when is small because X B represents a smaller fraction of bank B's reservation payo¤ E ( B ). < 0, i.e., an increase in Bank A's outside option leads to less asset sales, and this e¤ect is stronger when Bank B's bargaining power is large.
The intuition is as follows. An increase in X A reduces E ( B ) leading to less asset sales. The e¤ect is larger when is large because X A represents a smaller fraction of Bank A's payo¤. < 0, i.e., the more e¤ective Bank B is at managing Bank A's assets, the less asset sales will occur in equilibrium. There are two countervailing e¤ects. On the one hand, an increase in p B increases Bank B's payo¤ B when it makes the o¤er, which in turns increases its reservation payo¤ E ( B ) when Bank A makes the o¤er.
On the other hand, for a given reservation payo¤, Bank A needs to sell less assets to ensure that Bank B accepts the o¤er.
Outside options
We discuss factors a¤ecting the banks' outside options, relating them to the extent of speci…city of Bank A's assets and to the possibility of a Central Bank intervention.
Loan size distribution
We now model explicitly the fact that Bank A has access to competitive outside markets for borrowing and asset sales. We assume that Bank B has an advantage over outsiders both for using Bank A's assets and for lending against them, which we model as follows.
Asset sales: We assume that if an outsider operates a loan of Bank A with characteris-
We assume that Bank B has an advantage over outsiders both for managing Bank A's assets, i.e., p o ( ) < p B ( ); and that this advantage decreases with , i.e., dp o ( ) d > dp B ( ) d :
In other words, those projects for which Bank A's advantage over Bank B is the greatest are also those for which Bank B's advantage over outsiders is the greatest. Said di¤er-ently, we assume that Bank A-speci…city of loans and bank-speci…city of loans (relative to outsiders) are correlated. Note that this assumes a special role of banks relative to outsiders, e.g., banks are better monitors of small, relationship-speci…c loans (Fama, 1985 , James, 1987 , James and Houston, 1996 , among others).
Borrowing: We assume that Bank B is potentially more e¤ective than outsiders at making loans to Bank A in that it can better monitor Bank A's small loans compared to outsiders. 18;19 In particular, we assume that when borrowing from outsiders, Bank A's bene…t from not monitoring is b o b. Hence, when borrowing from outsiders, Bank A must retain a larger exposure to the loan to have an incentive to monitor, i.e.,
Suppose that bargaining has broken down and consider Bank A and Bank B's payo¤s. For now, we assume that Bank B's outside option X B is independent of Bank A's distribution of loan characteristics, i.e., of the cdf F . 20 As before, it will optimally sell to outsiders all loans with above a certain threshold^ o .
Lemma 2 Suppose that bargaining between Bank A and Bank B breaks down.
Bank A and outsiders agree on a sale of all assets with ^ o and a debt contract
Bank A's payo¤ (i.e., its outside option) is given by
These expressions forr o ,T o and^ o can be obtained using the analysis in Proposition 1 by substituting outsiders for Bank B, and its intuition is therefore similar. Indeed, the o¤er that Bank A makes to the outsiders is similar to that it would make to Bank B if Bank B 's outside option were E ( B ) = 0, and its ability to manage assets and lend against assets were the same as that of outsiders, i.e., p B ( ) = p o ( ) and R b = R o b . The expression of X A is also intuitive. Because selling assets is ine¢ cient, Bank A will sell as few as possible and borrow as much as possible against the assets it retains. This means that the only claim it will hold on each unit of asset is the absolute minimum R As a corollary, we get the e¤ect of the distribution of loan characteristics on Bank A's outside option X A . Speci…cally, we characterize the e¤ect on X A of a shift of the cdf towards higher values of in the sense of …rst order stochastic dominance (FOSD). 18 Several papers in the literature focus on the role of peer monitoring in interbank markets (see Rochet and Tirole, 1996, and Holthausen, 2005 for theoretical models based on this assumption, and Fur…ne, 2001 for empirica analysis in support of the assumption). Peer monitoring among banks is considered important because of the large and unsecured nature of the inter-bank loans. Also, inter-bank lending relationships are perceived to help overcome agency problems.
19 Also for now, we assume that a party's ability to monitor is independent of Bank A's asset mix. 20 This will not be the case, for instance, if Bank B has an easier time stealing one type of loans if bargaining breaks down.
Corollary 2 Bank A's outside option X A increases with the outsiders'ability to monitor loans to Bank A (i.e., decreases with b o ) and with a shift of the distribution F of loan characteristics towards higher values in the sense of FOSD.
We can now analyze the bargaining game between Bank A and B and derive properties of the equilibrium outcome. Recall that Bank A sells all its loans with above a threshold . This threshold does depend on the distribution of loan characteristics. Therefore the fraction [1 F ( )] of assets sold by Bank A to Bank B and the associated deadweight
depend on F directly but also through its e¤ect on the threshold .
Proposition 2 An improvement of the outsiders' ability to monitor loans to Bank A (i.e., a decrease in b o ) and a shift of the distribution F of loan characteristics towards higher values in the sense of FOSD have the following e¤ects:
The threshold over which loans are sold to Bank B increases.
The fraction of loans [1 F ( )] sold to Bank B decreases.
The deadweight loss associated with the liquidity transfer decreases.
The e¤ect of a decrease in b o is fairly straightforward. Indeed, such a change increases X A but keeps all other variables constant. Therefore, this result is a simply implication of Corollary 1. The e¤ect of a shift of F is more complex as it a¤ects not only Bank A's outside option in its bargaining with Bank B but also other variables relevant to that bargaining.
Our analysis implies that the market failure in the transfer of liquidity is more severe when banks that need liquidity have a large share of their portfolio in small, relationspeci…c loans, as this decreases the outside option of cash-stricken banks, giving cashrich banks a better opportunity to exert market power and exploit cash-stricken banks' di¢ culties. asset sales, in a number of related ways. We also discuss some alternative policies brie ‡y.
Central Bank

Lender of Last Resort (LOLR)
In this section, we analyze the LOLR role of the central bank. During this analysis, several interesting points arise. First, the Central Bank would not have to actually extend loans in equilibrium: It is su¢ cient that it provides potential competition to Bank B who would then have to lower the cost of liquidity. Therefore, the Central Bank could be e¤ective at little cost. Second, unless the Central Bank is a more e¤ective lender than outsiders, these loans would have to be loss-making. This in turn raises several issues: (i) if the Central Bank stands as a LOLR, it will have incentives to improve its ability to make loans, e.g., its ability to assess and monitor borrowing banks, possibly over and above that of outsiders; and (ii) it may be optimal to assign other tasks (e.g., supervision) to the Central Bank if they provide expertise in monitoring loans. 21 In the analysis to follow, we assume for simplicity that the outside option of Bank A is to generate liquidity from the Central Bank only, rather than both from outside markets as well from the Central Bank. While the latter case is more realistic, we focus on the simpler case as it has qualitatively similar implications.
Case 1: LOLR with no supervision and no loss-making loans
Suppose that the central bank is exactly as e¤ective as outsiders in monitoring Bank A's assets, that is, b CB = b o . Furthermore, suppose that the central bank is not willing to accept any expected losses from the loans it makes to Bank A. In that case, Bank A's outside option by going to the central (X CB A ) is exactly equal to the outside option when Bank A goes to the outsiders, that is,
Hence, in this case, the outcome does not change and the same amount of Bank A's assets are sold to Bank B.
Proposition 3 A Central Bank that does not make any loss-making loans to Bank A and is no better than outsiders in monitoring Bank A cannot ameliorate the ine¢ ciency arising from the market power of Bank B.
6.1.2 Case 2: LOLR with some loss-making loans, but no supervision
Now, suppose that the central bank is exactly as e¤ective as outsiders in monitoring Bank
A's assets, but is willing to accept some expected losses, which can be viewed as the central bank extending the range of collateral it accepts for its LOLR facility. Suppose that the central bank injects funds of T CB to Bank A. We assume that this results in a cost of 
Case 3: LOLR with supervision
In this section, we analyze how supervision of banks can provide an improvement and limit central bank's losses. Suppose that the Central Bank, by supervising banks, can monitor banks better than outsiders, i.e., b b CB b o , where b CB is the private bene…t when Bank B borrows from the Central Bank.
22;23
22 Our results would be stronger if we allow the Central Bank to be more e¢ cient that other banks in monitoring. However, what we derive is a stronger result as we show that even a Central Bank that is not necessarily as e¢ cient as other banks in monitoring can decrease the ine¢ ciency in liquidation.
23 Berger et al. (2000) test the hypothesis that supervisors have more accurate information than the market on the soundness of …nancial institutions using data from the US. They show that shortly after supervisors have inspected a bank, supervisory assesment of the bank is more accurate than the market. However, for periods where the supervisory information is not up-to-date, market has more accurate information than supervisors. 
Outsiders as monitors
The analysis begs the natural question of why outsiders do not monitor banks and assume some of the roles of the regulator. One potential reason for this is that banks may be more forthcoming to disclose information to the regulator, knowing that such information may not be used against them in the market, whereas outsiders, who may be participants of similar markets as banks, may not be credible in not using such information for their own advantage. Hence, banks may not be willing to disclose information to outsiders, whereas they may be more forthcoming to do so when they deal with the regulator.
Furthermore, it may be the case that with some probability, the Central Bank actually has to make the loan. The Central Bank may be willing to take that risk while outsiders are not. Also, it may be that in order to commit to being able to make the loan, the Central Bank has to tie up some capital, which is a cost outsiders would not want to incur.
Alternative policies
In this section, we brie ‡y discuss some alternative policies the regulator can employ to prevent excessive liquidation of Bank A's assets.
Price caps
First, the Central Bank can put a cap on the price that Bank B charges Bank A for the provision of liquidity. Note that this type of regulation would have to take the entire set of transactions between Bank A and Bank B into account. That is, regulating the lending rate only would not be e¤ective since for a given the same transfer T can be achieved with many pairs (L; P ). Hence, the regulator needs to introduce caps in the lending as well as the asset market.
However, introducing such price caps and enforcing them can be costly as the underlying parameters that a¤ect these prices keep on changing in reality. Hence, introducing price caps may not be a robust policy.
Intervention in the asset market
One other alternative policy the regulator can use is to intervene in the asset markets as the cash-rich banks can exploit their power and force excessive liquidations in this market. The regulator can intervene in the asset market and allocate Bank A's assets to Bank B on the condition that Bank B will lend to Bank A at competitive rates. This way, Bank A can borrow from Bank B at competitive rates and excessive liquidation of Bank A's assets is prevented.
Discussion
Ex-ante market for liquidity transfers
In Allen and Gale (2000) , banks insure each other against uncertain liquidity shocks that are imperfectly correlated across banks. While the interbank market can help transfer liquidity from cash-rich banks to cash-stricken banks, it cannot create additional liquidity.
Hence, the interbank market is inherently fragile in that when there is an aggregate shortage of liquidity, banks'cross holdings act as shock transmitters, spreading the initial shock to the entire banking system. Leitner (2005) builds a model of …nancial networks where linkages can lead to contagion as in Allen and Gale (2000) . However, the threat of contagion resulting from bank failures induce private-sector bailouts in which liquid banks bail out illiquid banks. He shows that when formal commitments are impossible, the possibility of private bailouts may make linkages optimal ex-ante since linkages allow banks to obtain mutual insurance. As in our model, he shows that when liquidity is concentrated among a small group of banks, the whole network may collapse as bailing out distressed banks may be too costly for banks with excess liquidity. However, in our model, the failure of private arrangements result from the bene…t cash-rich banks can get in the asset market resulting from their market power in the lending market, which are some di¤erentiating aspects of our model that lend our model some richness and generality.
Evidence of competitor gains in post-Federal Reserve banking system
The empirical event studies test whether bad news, such as a failure, the announcement of an unexpected increase in loan-loss reserves, seasoned stock issue announcements, etc., adversely a¤ect other …rms. If the e¤ect is negative, the empirical literature calls it the "contagion e¤ect." If the e¤ect is positive, it is termed the "competitive e¤ect." The intuition is that demand for the surviving competitors'products (deposits, in the case of banks) can increase. Saunders and Wilson (1996) 
Application to capital markets
In the last ten years, we have experienced two well-known episodes in the capital markets, the collapse of two hedge funds, Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 and that of Amaranth in 2006. In both of these episodes, there is suggestive evidence that other players in markets tried to bene…t from the di¢ culties of LTCM and Amaranth. Below, we provide a discussion of these two episodes in conjunction with some recent related studies.
After its remarkable success during 1994-1997, LTCM began to experience di¢ culties during the …nancial turmoil triggered by the Russian default in August 1998. During the crisis, LTCM had to buy large amounts of Treasury bond futures contracts to unwind its short position. With correct anticipation of the direction of LTCM's trades and the advantage of being able to observe customer order ‡ow, market makers had incentives to engage in front running, i.e., trading in the same direction as LTCM knowing that the order will be coming and then unwinding the position afterwards to pro…t from the price impact of the expected order.
For example, Business Week 26 wrote: "...if lenders know that a hedge fund needs to sell something quickly, they will sell the same asset, driving the price down even faster.
Goldman, Sachs & Co. and other counterparties to LTCM did exactly that in 1998." In a recent empirical study, Cai (2003) uses a unique dataset to examine the trading behavior of market makers in the Treasury bond futures market when LTCM faced binding margin constraints in 1998 and …nds evidence that during the crisis market makers in the aggregate engaged in front running against customer orders from a particular clearing …rm (coded PI7) that closely match various features of LTCM's trades through Bear 25 Lang and Stulz (1992) investigates the e¤ect of bankruptcy announcements on the equity value of bankrupt …rm's competitors. They …nd that the competitive e¤ect is dominant for highly concentrated industries with low leverage, suggesting that in such industries competitors bene…t from the di¢ culties of the bankrupt …rm. In particular, using the Her…ndahl index of industry concentration as a proxy for the degree of imperfect competition, they show that the value of competitors'equity actually increases by 2.2% in more concentrated industries with low leverage. Carlin, Lobo and Vishwanathan (2007) analyze the breakdown in cooperation between traders, which manifests itself in predatory trading leading to a liquidity crunch in the market. They build a repeated game where traders cooperate most of the time through repeated interaction and provide liquidity to each other. However, cooperation can break down, especially when the stakes are high, which leads to predatory trading. While our paper has similarities with these studies, our model is not exclusively about predatory trading or the break-down of cooperation that has been established through repeated interaction, but is about the ability to exploit market power in one market (inter-bank lending market) to bene…t in another market (market for asset sales). More broadly, our model shows that when liquidity is distributed asymmetrically and surplus liquidity is concentrated in the hands of a few players, market failures in liquidity transfers can arise, a point that should …nd resonance and application in many settings, not just in the context of banking.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose that during crises, surplus banks may not lend e¢ ciently to needy banks due to the strategic gains to be made upon the closure of troubled banks or more generally, upon the liquidation of their assets. This problem was shown to be more acute the weaker the market for assets outside of the banking sector, a scenario that would arise, for instance, in liquidation of information-sensitive and speci…c loans made to small borrowers.
Such strategic behavior describes well the crises episodes in the pre-Federal Reserve era and provides a rationale for the existence of the Central Bank. A Central Bank, that is credible in providing liquidity to banks in need at competitive rates, can eliminate the bargaining power of surplus banks in the inter-bank market and thereby restore the e¢ ciency of liquidity transfers and asset sales. This lender-of-last-resort rationale is complementary to the traditional rationale for existence of the Central Bank which is as a lender of last resort when there is an aggregate shortage of liquidity. Our model illustrates that the public provision of liquidity can improve the private provision of liquidity even when there is no aggregate shortage of liquidity. More broadly, our model also provides a rationale for the Central Bank or a similar regulator to play the role of coordinating liquidity injection to needy institutions, if required, through moral suasion.
Proof of Lemma 1: It is easy to see that the problem can be written as:
From Assumption 1, the FOC can be written as:
so that the constarint is binding. Hence, we have F (^ B ) =
: Thus, we can write Bank B's expected payo¤ as:
Proof of Proposition 1: Bank B's participation constraint is binding since otherwise, Bank A can always increase the transfer from Bank B. Hence, we have:
In turn, we can write the maximization problem as:
Since p H > p B ( ) for all 2 (0; +1); the objective increases in : Hence, by combining the two constarints from the original problem, Bank A's problem can be written as max s:t:
Note that the left-hand side of the constraint is decreasing in since from Assumption 1, we have p H (R R b ) < p B ( )R: Hence, the constraint is binding so that T = F ( ) and satis…es:
Proof of Corollary 2: Let F and G be two cdfs for ; with the property that F FOSD G. Let^ 
TO BE COMPLETED.
Proof of Proposition 2: TO BE COMPLETED. where r is the average interest rate on a call loan at the NYSE, C is the percentage deviation from trend in the excess cash reserves of the New York reserve banks, D is the percentage rate of change in bank deposits, S is the percentage rate of change in stock prices, P is the dummy variable (1 for panic, 0 for nonpanic periods), u is a random shock, and the βs and γs are parameters to be estimated. t statistic or degrees of freedom are in parentheses. An asterisk notes that the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient or of no structural change rejected at 95%. All data were measured at weekly intervals from 1867 to1933.
t = 0 t = 1 States
Low ρ
• Bank A generates the needed liquidity by pledging future return.
• No need for (partial) liquidation of Bank A's portfolio.
• Bank A is hit by a liquidity shock of ρ.
• Bank A invest I units in a risky project.
High ρ
• Bank A cannot generate the needed the liquidity only through pledging its future return.
• A fraction α of Bank A's portfolio is sold.
• Potential misallocation cost. 
